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The Optimizely Website Attack: Who Is Affected and What to Do

Gregory Rivers, Founder & CEO November 17, 2026 7 min read
Stock photo: a rusty chain and padlock locking a chain-link fence gate on a quiet road.
Stock photo by Travis Saylor on Pexels. It illustrates the topic and is not a photo of Norvet work.

On Monday, November 16, 2026, malicious code ran on the websites of 178 organizations, including Zoom, CNN, the BBC, HSBC, Salesforce and IKEA. The code did not come from someone breaking into those companies' own servers. As reported so far, it came through one vendor they all use. If you saw the headlines and wondered whether this touches you or your business, this post sorts it out by who is actually affected.

Everything here is as reported on November 17, 2026. Investigations are still going, so details may change. The sources are listed at the bottom.

What happened, in plain terms

Optimizely is a company whose software lets a website test two versions of a page to see which one works better. To do that, a website adds one small piece of code that loads Optimizely's script every time someone visits. That script is written in JavaScript, the programming language that runs inside your web browser and makes pages interactive. It is also able to read what you type into a page.

Optimizely told BleepingComputer that an unauthorized party used a flaw in its account sign-up process to add malicious JavaScript to some customers' projects. Because the bad code was served from Optimizely's own systems, the websites treated it as trusted. A researcher named Scott Helme at a security company called Report URI found it.

Here is the timeline Report URI published, in UTC (Eastern time is five hours behind right now):

  • The first infected script was seen at 04:21 UTC on November 16, which is 11:21 p.m. Eastern on Sunday, November 15.
  • The card-stealing part was added at about 13:43 UTC, which is 8:43 a.m. Eastern on Monday.
  • Report URI says every infected file was clean by 23:11 UTC, which is 6:11 p.m. Eastern on Monday.
  • Optimizely says it fixed the flaw and removed the injected code from affected projects.

Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely scripts and found 188 infected, belonging to 178 organizations. Banks and financial firms were the largest group, at 32.

The code did three things. It swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's own, and about $7,000 reached the attacker's wallets before they were emptied. It copied card numbers, expiry dates and security codes typed into a website's own payment forms. And it collected cookies (small files that can keep you signed in) and screenshots of the page.

Who is affected

1. People who visited an affected site between Sunday night and Monday evening

This is the main group, and the real risk is narrower than the headlines suggest. The card-stealing code only worked on payment boxes that are part of the website itself. Report URI says payment boxes run by a separate payment company (hosted payment frames) were out of its reach. Report URI also says there is no way to see how many cards were copied, so nobody can say how many people were hit.

The exposure window ran from 11:21 p.m. Eastern on Sunday, November 15, to 6:11 p.m. Eastern on Monday, November 16. If you typed a card number into one of these sites' own checkout forms in that window, were signed in to an account on one of them, or sent cryptocurrency while any tab on one of them was open, do these things:

  • Look over your card statements for charges you do not recognize, and call your bank if you see one.
  • If you sent crypto in that window, check that the address you pasted matched the one you meant to pay. Report URI says the code swapped addresses when you copied them, and that an address copied from anywhere else, not just from an affected site, could be replaced while an affected tab stayed open. If one was wrong, contact the exchange or wallet provider right away.
  • Ask your bank whether it recommends replacing the card. That is the bank's call, and the bank can see things we cannot.
  • If you were signed in to an account on one of these sites (a bank, for instance), sign out of every device and session, or ask the company to end all your sessions, then change the password and check recent account activity. Report URI says the code could send the page address, a screenshot, and cookies that are not marked HttpOnly, and tells site owners to treat session tokens as exposed and rotate them. A stolen sign-in token can work without your password, so changing the password alone may not lock an attacker out.

As for your card specifically, nothing in the reports says that reading an article or watching a video on one of these sites put it at risk. Being signed in, or sending crypto while an affected tab was open, is a separate question, covered in the last two steps above.

2. iPhone and iPad owners with older software

On iPhones and iPads, the code did something extra. Report URI says it loaded what are called exploit kits in a hidden part of the page. An exploit kit is a toolbox that tries known weak spots in a device's software, and it can run just from visiting a page, with no download or tap needed.

According to MacRumors, one kit (called Coruna) was aimed at iOS 13 through 17 and another (called DarkSword) at iOS 18. Code for iOS 26 appeared to only identify the device. Researchers at Hudson Rock say they have not seen proof that any real phone was successfully taken over, and MacRumors says it is unclear whether any were. So this is a "check and update" situation, not a "your phone is hacked" one.

The fix is the same as always. Open Settings, then General, then Software Update, and install whatever is waiting. Then turn on automatic updates there so you do not have to remember. We are not quoting specific version numbers, because the numbers circulating online come from the attackers' own code comments and reader comments, and we could not confirm them in Apple's notes. Apple lists its updates on its security releases page, linked below.

3. What the Zoom listing does and does not mean

Zoom is on the list, and it is worth being exact about what that means. Zoom's website loaded an Optimizely script, so the bad code ran in the browsers of people visiting Zoom's website. None of the sources we read says Zoom's meetings, its app or its customer accounts were breached. If you opened Zoom's website in that window, that is group 1 above. The same goes for the other names on the list: it means their websites served the code, not that their internal systems were broken into.

Helme himself writes that attackers could have done worse things with this access, such as publishing a fake breaking-news story or taking data from a banking page. He says none of that is known to have happened.

4. Businesses that run outside code on their own website

You do not have to use Optimizely to have this kind of exposure. Many small-business websites load outside code for analytics, chat boxes, ad tracking, review badges, booking forms and page testing. Each one is a door into your site that someone else holds the key to. This incident shows what happens when one of those keys is misused.

Report URI also looked at which sites had a Content Security Policy. That is a rule list your website sends to browsers saying which sources of code may run and where the page may send data. Among the sites checked, 68 had none, 50 had one that let the code run and send stolen data out, 17 had one that let the code run but blocked the data from leaving, and 24 had one that stopped it entirely. Putting Optimizely's own web address on the approved list did not help, because the bad code came from that address.

What a small business can do this week

None of this requires you to become a security expert. Four steps cover most of it.

Know what outside code your site runs

Ask whoever built or manages your website for a plain list of every outside script it loads, and what each one is for. Remove the ones nobody uses anymore. Helme's advice is to cut dependencies you do not need, because every one you remove is one less thing that can be misused.

Lock down the vendor accounts behind those scripts

Find out who has a login to each of those vendor accounts, remove people who no longer need one, and turn on two-step sign-in. This incident started with an account-level flaw at a vendor, so you cannot fully control it, but tidy access limits the damage when something goes wrong.

Add a safety net

Ask your web provider about a Content Security Policy. Helme suggests starting in report-only mode, which warns you when new code appears without blocking anything, then tightening it over time.

Keep card numbers off your own forms, and keep devices updated

If you take payments online, use a payment page or box run by your payment company instead of your own form. That is the kind of box this skimmer could not reach. And keep every phone, tablet and laptop on automatic updates.

If you do use Optimizely, Report URI recommends checking every Project JavaScript and experiment for the text 1688360.cc and for atob( and for any script you do not recognize, reviewing who can sign in to the account, rotating credentials, and considering telling customers who entered card details on your own forms on November 16.

Where Norvet MSP fits

Norvet MSP is an outsourced IT department for small businesses in metro Atlanta. If you would like help asking your web provider the right questions about the outside scripts your site loads and who holds the keys to those vendor accounts, or checking whether your team's phones and laptops update on their own, we are glad to talk it through with you. Contact Norvet MSP at norvetmsp.com/contact to set up a conversation.

Sources

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